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Ray Argyle, The Paris Game: Charles de Gaulle, the Liberation of
Paris, and the Gamble that Won France. Toronto: Dundurn, 214.
Pp. 488.
De Gaulle was certainly one of the most important, if not the
most, important political figure in modern France and as such has
enjoyed several biographies, among which stands Jean Lacouture’s
monumental opus De Gaulle, published in three volumes between
1984 and 1986.1 Ray Argyle’s book thus treads well-known grounds,
but is an interesting and enjoyable read marketed for a public
audience.
The Paris Game, a clear hint at the Great Game played by Russia
and Britain during the nineteenth century, deftly moves between the
biography of Charles De Gaulle, his military and political career,
and the intricate political web in the Allied camp during the Second
World War. Indeed, even though the book spans the whole life of
General De Gaulle, The Paris Game chiefly focuses on the Second
World War, with only a few chapters devoted to his political career
in postwar years.
A key theme informing this work is arguably the fractious, and at
times openly hostile, triangular relationship between English Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, American President Franklin Roosevelt
and De Gaulle, since June 1940 the leader of the France Libre, the
political organization in exile fighting the Axis Powers. The caustic
diatribes between the witty and boisterous Englishman and the
opinionated French were legendary, well encapsulated in Churchill’s
furious remark: “He thinks he’s Joan of Arc, but I can’t get my
bloody bishops to burn him.”2 The problematic relationship almost
reached a point of no return when, on the eve of D-Day, De Gaulle
refused to endorse the message Eisenhower would broadcast before
the attack that failed to mention even the mere existence of the
French government in exile. To make matters worse, the General was

Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, (3 volumes): 1 — Le Rebelle (1890-1944), 2 — Le
Politique (1944-1959), 3 — Le Souverain (1959-1970), Paris: Le Seuil, 1984, 1985 et
1986. The English version was published in two volumes by W.W. Norton in 1991
and 1993.
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the last speaker after all the other representatives of the other Allied
governments and right after Eisenhower’s speech (pp. 208-210). De
Gaulle’s refusal threatened to tear apart the coalition but eventually
the situation was defused when his inspirational speech beamed the
dawn of the attack and gave a rally cry to French resisters and
civilians to help the Allied invasion.3
The frantic period before D-Day highlights also the clear distrust
of President Roosevelt concerning General De Gaulle. Argyle shows
with admirable clarity that from the onset of the occupation of France,
the Roosevelt administration frowned upon De Gaulle, deemed a
conservative military with little political following. For this reason,
until November 1942, the United States maintained a diplomatic
relationship with Vichy, the pro-Nazi collaborationist regime in
France. The American administration’s distrust of the Free France
is evident on the effort of sidelining De Gaulle even for Operation
Torch, by seeking at first the services of the head of the French Navy,
Admiral François Darlan, and later on the help of another former
Vichy official, General Henri Giraud (pp. 171-173; pp. 187-188).
Eventually, Roosevelt had to relent, as Darlan’s untimely death and
Giraud’s lack of charisma projected De Gaulle as unrivalled leader of
the French Resistance.
The Paris Game should not be solely read as a work on Allied
diplomatic history. The book also delves into De Gaulle’s private
sphere, his strong familial bonds, especially with his beloved daughter
Anne, who was born with Down syndrome, and his son Philippe, who
participated as a junior officer in the Free French Naval Forces in the
Battle of France (1944-1945). Argyle succeeds to humanize General
De Gaulle, who had been often stereotyped as an extremely cold
and distant political figure, also by showing his sincere appreciation
for those who had risked their lives during the German occupation
years for sheltering downed Allied pilots or helping the Maquis (p.
217). While the author is an admirer of De Gaulle’s work, a feeling
he declares straight from the introduction, his work is well-researched
and avoids the pitfalls of a hagiographic account. Of particular
De Gaulle and Churchill’s stormy relationship should not make us forget that the
two men deeply respected each other, acknowledging their respective political roles
as beacons of hope for the fight against the Axis forces. In November 1958, upon
De Gaulle’s insistence, Churchill was invested with the Croix de la Libération, one
of the top honors awarded for men and women whose deeds were significant in the
Liberation of France during the Second World War.
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interest for Canadian readers is Argyle’s effort in meshing into the
story Canadian politics, as in the case of the dichotomy between
the French Canadian support for Vichy and the more pro-Allied
English Canadian stance (pp. 170-171). My only criticism of the book
is the presence of several typos (some downright glaring such as the
misspelling of “Churchill” p. 72) that could have been easily picked
out by a more thorough copy editor. These shortcomings should not
detract from the value of The Paris Game, a welcome addition on
one of the architects of the Allied victory in the Second World War.
emanuele sica , royal military college of canada
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